Abstract. We analyse whether the determinants of capital found in the previous literature hold for the special German banking sector comprising three characteristic banking groups including savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks, which differ regarding their ownership and their access to the capital market. Through the use of accounting data from German banks between 1992 and 2001 we find evidence in accordance with the buffer theory of capital for all German banking groups. Furthermore, we also detect some remarkable differences between the three banking groups regarding their determination of capital due to institutional characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
Because the risk-based capital standard (Basle Accord) took effect in the G10 countries at the end of 1992, banks are obliged to hold a minimum regulatory capital ratio of 8% of risk-weighted assets. Otherwise, the regulator might interfere and even close the bank. According to the capital buffer theory, banks try to maintain a certain buffer of regulatory capital above the regulatory minimum. As a consequence, portfolio risk and regulatory capital are expected to be positively related. Banks increase capital when increasing portfolio risk and vice versa in order to maintain their capital buffer.
Indeed, evidence from the US banking sector by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) , Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) as well as by Rime (2001) from Switzerland confirm this positive relationship. Evidence by Heid et al. (2004) , focusing on German savings banks seems to confirm the relationship for German banks as well. However, a comprehensive study for all German banks comprising savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks is still missing. In fact, the German banking system should be of special interest. In an international context, German banks are less profitable and have smaller capital ratios than banks in most other countries according to the OECD (2000) . As a consequence, banking regulation may be expected to be more binding in Germany. Low profitability and capitalization might be particularly problematic for savings banks, whose access to the capital market is limited. Consequently, it is argued that savings banks in Germany should be further opened for private capital, because some savings banks might lack capital to fund their business growth. The International Monetary Fund (2003) , for instance, recommended the German government to facilitate a market-orientated restructuring of the savings banks. This study contributes to the discussion by analysing whether savings banks are potentially in need of ( private) external capital to fund themselves.
In order to analyse the banks' determinants of capital dependent on their special institutional characteristics, we deliberately differentiate between these three 'pillars' of the German banking system. 1 The first 'pillar' of the German banking system comprises the German savings banks, which are the only savings banks within Europe that are still state-owned. They were founded by the municipalities and districts, which provided them with the necessary capital equipment to conduct their business. Additional capital injections from the responsible local authorities, however, were very rare in the last few decades, because the local authorities usually were not able to provide capital due to their high indebtedness. As a consequence, the savings banks' disadvantage in meeting capital standards could become relevant in case of low profitability. Because of their special legal form, savings banks are not able to issue new shares on the capital market. Their only alternatives to obtain external capital are to issue subordinate debt, some other hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital ) or to receive capital from sleeping partners.
2 However, the absorption of capital of sleeping partners in case of savings banks is strongly restricted by law and thus is of much lower importance than issuing subordinate debt. According to Deutsche Bundesbank (2002) , many savings banks have already issued subordinate debt up to 50% of Tier 1 capital so that the limit to which subordinate debt is acknowledged as Tier 2 capital is almost achieved.
Cooperative banks make up the second 'pillar'. Similar to savings banks, their business is restricted to the local region in which they operate to avoid competition with other cooperative banks. However, in contrast to savings banks, they belong to their cooperative members. Therefore, cooperative banks depend on a sufficient pool of members to finance their business. New members can participate in the cooperative bank by purchasing shares in the business. As these banks consequently can receive fresh capital by winning new members, they may rely on accumulating profits to a lesser extent. In this regard, accumulating profits may be less important than attracting new members, which means paying high dividends.
The third 'pillar' comprises all other banks. Among them are private commercial banks, i.e. big banks, branches of foreign banks as well as ( private) regional banks and other commercial banks. Banks within the group titled other banks have easier access to the capital market than savings and cooperative banks, because about 40% of them are joint-stock companies, which can easily raise external equity capital on the financial market. As argued by Dahl and Shrieves (1990) , the magnitude of equity infusions makes them an important instrument to increase the bank capital ratio. Those banks in other legal forms are often subsidiaries of larger financial institutions and may easily obtain additional equity capital from their parent company. An additional difference is the fact that these banks are allowed to operate nationally or even internationally. As a consequence, their credit portfolios may be more broadly diversified.
The different institutional characteristics of these banking groups may be responsible for a different behaviour regarding the determination of their capital ratio, even though all German banking groups are subject to the same regulatory capital requirements and are supervised by the same regulatory agencies. With regard to Tier 1 capital, state-owned savings banks and cooperative banks have quasi-prohibitive high costs of external finance compared with joint-stock banks with publicly traded stocks. The responsible local authorities could not provide the savings banks with additional capital due to their high indebtedness and the cooperative banks cannot force their members to pay in additional capital. Therefore, it is worth analysing these different banking groups in detail.
This paper adds to the literature by examining capital management of all three German banking groups. Finally, a more appropriate econometric methodology is applied. We estimate dynamic panel regressions using the generalized method of moments (GMM), which allows us to efficiently consider the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The structure of this supplementary capital instruments like subordinated debt or hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital), which are less capable of absorbing potential losses. Usually, subordinated debt makes up a great deal of Tier 2 capital. According to regulation, Tier 1 capital must amount to at least 4% of risk-weighted assets and both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to at least 8% of riskweighted assets. study is as follows. Section 2 presents some hypotheses to be examined. Section 3 characterizes the dataset and Section 4 introduces the empirical methodology and the final specification of the model. Section 5 presents the results regarding the determinants of bank capital and Section 6 concludes.
HYPOTHESES
According to the capital buffer theory, banks wish to hold a certain amount of excess regulatory capital above the regulatory minimum. The reasoning behind their aim to maintain a certain capital buffer are the explicit and implicit regulatory costs, which would be the result of falling very close to or below the regulatory minimum. Buser et al. (1981) and Milne and Whalley (2001) argue that implicit costs of regulation may arise because of regulatory interference, which reduces the charter value 4 of the bank. Consequently, banks' changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio should be positively related, as banks wish to maintain their regulatory capital ratio. For banks that have left their target capital zone and have fallen close to the regulatory minimum, however, we may find a negative relationship between changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio, because these banks might have an incentive to return to their capital buffer by increasing capital and decreasing risk. The buffer theory, however, should not be relevant for banks having an extraordinarily high capital ratio, because they are far away from experiencing regulatory costs. Consequently, we expect no significant relationship between changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio for these banks.
Hypotheses 1A (H1A) and 1B (H1B): Changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio are positively (negatively) related for well (less) capitalized banks.
Hypothesis 1C (H1C): Changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio are unrelated in the case of very strongly capitalized banks for which the buffer theory should not hold.
The banks' profitability determines the banks' ability to increase capital by accumulating profits. That is why a positive relationship between the banks' profitability and the target capital ratio may be presumed. A positive relationship would also be consistent with the pecking-order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) , stressing the bank's preference for internal funding due to lower costs. A positive relationship, however, is not compelling. Nevertheless, it is expected that the positive relationship holds at least for savings banks, as they have fewer alternatives to fund themselves. Furthermore, they do not have parent companies they must transfer profits to and usually do not pay out profits or, if so, they have very low payout ratios.
5 As a consequence, retained earnings are a cheaper source of equity, than external equity, especially for savings banks.
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): The higher the profitability, the higher the banks' target capital ratio.
Hypothesis 2B (H2B): Profitability as a determinant of the target capital ratio is most important for savings banks.
There are several reasons why larger banks may target a lower capital ratio. Larger banks may have easier access to the capital market and can raise external capital more easily due to lower transaction costs. Thus they may have greater financial flexibility and may need less excess regulatory capital than smaller banks. In addition, they are more likely to have a more diversified portfolio and thus need less excess capital from the bank manager's point of view. According to Titman and Wessels (1988) , fixed direct bankruptcy costs finally constitute a smaller portion of firm value when the firm is larger, lowering the importance of bankruptcy costs. This size effect, however, should be smaller for cooperative banks and particularly for savings banks. These banks are financially less flexible due to their legal form. Additionally, even large savings and cooperative banks may need a high capital ratio due to limited scale effects in the diversification of their credit portfolio, because their business is limited to a certain local area. In contrast to cooperative banks and other banks, bankruptcy costs may be less important even for small savings banks because of the maintenance and guarantee obligation (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung) granted to savings banks until July 2005, which supplemented the potent German deposit insurance system and completely prevented all savings banks from becoming insolvent.
Hypothesis 3A (H3A): The larger the bank, the lower the target capital ratio (size effect).
Hypothesis 3B (H3B):
The size effect is weaker for savings and cooperative banks.
DATA
We examine German banks using a unique dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. It comprises yearly (end-of-December) unconsolidated balance sheet and profit and loss account information from almost all German banks (no building and loan associations) reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1992 Bundesbank from to 2001 In order to analyse the banks' behaviour in detail, we divide the 5. The dataset is unconsolidated and thus indicates profit transfers to or from the parent companies. 6. Some cooperative banks and other banks could not be taken into account because of data restrictions. Furthermore, we excluded banks with six and fewer consecutive observations from the dataset, as we need a longer number of continuous observations of each bank to run dynamic panel regressions.
heterogeneous sample of all German banks into three subsamples. The first one comprises all German savings banks and the second subsample consists of nearly all German cooperative banks. The third group is denoted other banks. On the one hand, these other banks comprise commercial banks, i.e. big banks, branches of foreign banks as well as ( private) regional banks and other commercial banks.
On the other hand, the group of other banks comprises mortgage banks, Landesbanks, regional institutions of credit cooperatives, and special-purpose banks (Banken mit Sonderaufgaben). A more detailed analysis of other banks is not possible, as the dataset allows no further identification of each bank. 
Bank capital
Two different definitions of capital ratios are presented in this study to obtain a differentiated impression of how banks determine their target capital ratios. The first one is a simple capital ratio defined as equity capital from the balance sheet over total assets (CAP1). Alternatively, the results do not change with the inclusion of the fund for general bank risks according to the definition of Tier 1 capital. The second definition (CAP2) refers to total regulatory capital (Tier 1 þ Tier 2). It is defined as the ratio of paid-up equity capital including the fund for general bank risks, subordinate debt and other hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital), which in total are divided by total assets. 
Bank risk
Banks' portfolio risk (RISK) is measured by the ratio of risk-weighted on-balance-sheet assets over total assets. 9 We use the risk weights suggested by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation in 1988, which were relevant in the period 1992 to 2001. Within the Basle Accord framework the individual assets of a bank are weighted according to some broad risk classes. Recent literature has pointed to the fact that such a measure of portfolio risk is too rough to indicate the banks' probability of default. However, in this study, we are less interested in an accurate measure of the probability of 7. Similar conclusions can be drawn by focusing on universal banks only, which are defined as banks with ratios of loans over total assets and deposits from non-bank customers over total assets of at least 30%. Furthermore, we also used an alternative dataset from Hoppenstedt, which provides detailed information about the banking group and legal form, but is unrepresentative, because it is only comprised of a subsample of all German banks. Nevertheless, we obtained very similar results, when we clearly focused on commercial banks only. We also limited our analysis to joint-stock companies only and, again, the conclusions support our findings from the Bundesbank dataset. 8. Because we do not have any information about hidden reserves or revaluation reserves, CAP2 is a little smaller than the actual sum of Tier 1 þ Tier 2 over total assets (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003) . 9. Other risk assets like off-balance-sheet engagements and derivatives as well as market risk could not be considered because of data restrictions.
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PARTIAL-ADJUSTMENT FRAMEWORK AND SPECIFICATION
Building on Shrieves and Dahl (1992) , we assume that banks consciously aim at a certain target capital ratio [see Diamond and Rajan (2000) for the existence of an optimal bank capital ratio] and presume that changes in the bank capital ratio result from discretionary adjustments towards the target capital ratio and factors exogenous to the bank:
where DCAP j,t is the observed change in the capital ratio for bank j in period t, DCAP d j,t is the discretionary change, and e j,t is the exogenous random shock, for example an unanticipated economic shock. The discretionary changes in the capital ratio DCAP d j,t are modelled within a partial-adjustment framework. Institutional inertia, high costs of rapid change, or a lack of information may prevent banks from reaching their target capital ratio instantaneously. Marcus (1983) and Peltzman (1970) were among the first to model the bank capital decision within a partial-adjustment model. Consequently, we rewrite equation (1) as follows:
where a is the speed of adjustment, and CAP * j;t denotes the target capital ratio for bank j in period t, which is not directly observable. By adding lagged capital to both sides of the equation we obtain the following equation:
Variables affecting target capital
Because the target capital ratio CAP * j;t is not directly observable, some observable proxy variables must be found. In the following, the explanatory variables are presented, which affect the target capital ratio and thus determine changes in capital.
Portfolio risk
Changes in the capital ratio and portfolio risk are supposed to be interrelated due to banking regulations (see H1A and H1B). Therefore, we included DRISK in the capital equation.
Profitability
Corresponding to H2A, the target capital ratio may be influenced by banks' profitability. Thus, we also inserted the return on assets (ROA) as a common measure of profitability in the equation. ROA is defined as the annual net profit, net of provisions and after taxes divided by total assets.
Bank deposits from non-bank customers
In order to control for the potential effect on the target capital ratio, we include the bank deposit ratio (BDR), defined as the ratio of all liabilities to non-bank customers 10 divided by total assets, in the capital equation.
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Bank deposits from non-bank customers are a very attractive means to fund a bank, because of the relatively lower interest rates compared with those of bearer bonds or borrowing from banks. Banks, therefore, compete for these deposits. In accordance with Gupta and Walker (1975) , an increasing level of bank deposits from non-bank customers may be a proxy for the banks' competitiveness and positive earnings expectations in future years. Therefore, banks with a higher BDR might be able to increase capital more easily than other banks. The more depositors, for example, a cooperative bank has, the more likely is the bank to gain new members and to increase capital.
Provisions
We consider new loan loss provisions over total assets ( PROV ) as a potential determinant of the target capital ratio, as this ratio may indicate the banks' financial health. Provisions can be interpreted as an alternative measure of portfolio risk, because their direct effect on profits is controlled for by including ROA in the regression. A negative impact of PROV on changes in capital could mean that banks in financial distress have more difficulties in increasing their capital ratio. In contrast, a positive effect could signal that banks voluntarily increase their capital to a greater extent in order to overcome their bad financial situation. Shrieves and Dahl (2003) argue that earnings management may reduce the relationship between provisions and capital because banks have discretion over the timing of gains and losses on security transactions. Savings banks, however, may have few possibilities to realize security gains, because their participations are restricted by law.
Regulatory pressure
A bank having a regulatory capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum may have an incentive to increase its regulatory capital ratio in order to prevent this ratio from falling below the regulatory minimum. Otherwise regulatory costs may arise. To capture this potential effect we include a dummy variable REG into the equation indicating the banks' regulatory pressure. 12 In accordance with Ediz et al. (1998) and Rime (2001) we assume that both the ratio of capital over risk-weighted assets (CRWA) and its volatility must be considered when measuring regulatory pressure, as the probability of falling below the regulatory minimum increases with the volatility of the capital ratio. The dummy variable REG is based on lagged capital and equals unity if the ratio of capital over risk-weighted assets is within one standard deviation of a certain threshold and zero otherwise. Here, we set the threshold at the 25 percentile of the least capitalized German banks.
13 Finally, we also interacted REG with DRISK in order to measure the coordination of risk and capital for banks under regulatory pressure.
Merger
The German banking sector is characterized by many mergers and acquisitions in recent years, which could have a direct impact on the banks' capital ratio. We control for this effect by including the variable MERG into the capital equation. The dummy variable equals unity if a bank has taken over another bank in the same year and zero otherwise.
14 If distress mergers among savings or cooperative banks dominated, we would expect a negative impact of the dummy variable on the target capital ratio.
Size
Corresponding to H3A, size may have an influence on the target capital ratio. To capture size effects, the natural log of total assets (SIZE) is included in the capital equation.
Considering these explanatory variables, the final specification of the capital equation is as follows:
where u j,t 5 m j þ e j,t with m j $ IID(0, s 2 m ) and e j,t $ IID(0, s 2 e ). Time dummies, although not particularly indicated, are included in the model as well in order 12. We assume that REG indicates regulatory pressure, although we cannot exclude that it partly measures the banks' own incentive to prevent bankruptcy costs. 13. We also experimented with other definitions of regulatory pressure, but obtained very similar results. 14. The dummy variable MERG was kindly provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 15. We include the lagged value of the dummy variable REG into our equation. Regulatory pressure in the previous year can lead the bank to increase the capital ratio in the next year.
However, including the current dummy variable instead of the lagged dummy variable in the equation would lead to a potential problem of simultaneity: a bank under regulatory pressure in period t is unlikely to have increased its capital ratio above average in period t.
to consider macroeconomic or other shocks. We estimate the model with both definitions of capital over total assets (CAP1 and CAP2) as dependent variables. Table 1 indicates a decreasing market share of both savings banks and cooperative banks due to a below-average growth in assets. Potentially, a shortage of equity capital is responsible for the accelerating downward trend in assets. The high share of subordinate debt over total assets (SDEBT ) for savings banks suggests that these banks compensate their lower equity capital ratio by issuing subordinate debt. However, some savings banks already have issued nearly the maximum amount of eligible subordinated debt in recent years. Furthermore, the mergers among savings banks and cooperative banks in order to increase profitability could not stop the decline in market shares.
Considering the panel structure
In contrast to many previous studies, for example by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) , Jacques and Nigro (1997) , Rime (2001) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) , we explicitly consider the bank-specific effects m i as well. 16 Therefore, we are able to consider the specific characteristics of each individual bank. However, considering bank-specific effects m i results in some econometric challenge. Because the lagged dependent variable CAP i,tÀ1 will be correlated with the error term according to Nickell (1981) , we had to estimate equation (4) in first differences and to instrument the lagged dependent variable in first differences with the help of its own lagged values. We applied the GMM, which is argued to be most appropriate in the context of dynamic panel analysis according to Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 17 Banking regulation amplifies the interrelationship of capital and portfolio risk. Therefore, portfolio risk is an endogenous variable and has to be instrumented. However, other explanatory variables, for example ROA and PROV, may be endogenous as well (Berger, 1995; McNichols and Wilson, 1988) . Supported by statistical tests, we treated all explanatory variables as potentially endogenous. 18 We employed two methods (GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS) to instrument the explanatory variables. GMM-DIF indicates the conventional GMM model in first differences (GMM-DIF) by Arellano and 16. We also estimated a simultaneous equation model (including a second equation explaining DRISK) with pooled data in line with prior research, and obtained similar results. Regression results from 2SLS and 3SLS confirm our main findings in this paper. 17. We use the two-step version of the GMM estimator to obtain the Sargan test statistics, as the one-step version of the Sargan test over-rejects the validity of the set of instruments in the presence of heteroscedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991) , the coefficient estimates are based on the one-step version. All calculations were conducted with Stata 8.0 and the DPD software package for Ox (see Doornik et al., 2002 
Notes:
Market shares refer to total assets of the relevant banking group. Asset growth is indicated in year-on-year growth rates (e.g. 0.10 means an increase by 10%).
The table also presents the means of the variables for each year of the reference period and differentiates between the three banking groups.
Bond (1991), which uses the lagged variables in levels to instrument the variables in first differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , however, proposed using a system of instruments to increase the precision of the estimator (GMM-SYS). In addition to using instruments in levels for equations in first differences, they used instruments in first differences for equations in levels. As a consequence, GMM-SYS thus usually provides higher precision of coefficients, but makes it even more difficult to find suitable instruments. Because GMM-SYS failed to pass the specification tests in some cases, 19 we both estimated GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS. Tables 2a and 2b show the GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS results for the dynamic model given by equation (4). We present the results for the three banking groups of savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks and differentiate between both definitions of capital to reveal potential variations in the results. In order to differentiate between banks, which might be particularly constrained by regulation, we also analysed moderately capitalized banks within each group, which have a Tier 1 capital to a riskweighted assets ratio of less than 20%. Because there are no savings banks with a Tier 1 ratio above 20%, all savings banks are moderately capitalized by this definition. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (CAP tÀ1 ) represents 1 À a and thus indirectly reveals the speed of adjustment a. The coefficient 0.7372 for the savings banks, for example, indicates that the speed of adjustment is 0.2628, i.e. that it takes 3.8 years to reach the capital target (see Table 2a ). We find that the speed of adjustment is usually significantly different from 0 and 1, respectively. Therefore, a partial adjustment towards the target capital ratio is confirmed. 20 The banks approach their capital target without overshooting it. Nevertheless, results indicate that the speed of adjustment (a) is comparatively slow for savings and cooperative banks, but higher for the group of other banks. These banks have some additional opportunities to manage their capital level by transferring capital from or to their parent 19. There are two specification tests. First, absence of second-order autocorrelation in the residuals in first differences is a necessary condition for obtaining consistent estimates. Second, the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions should indicate that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals and thus are valid. Because the Sargan test sheds some doubt on the validity of the instruments in the total sample of cooperative banks even in the case of GMM-DIF, we gradually reduced the number of observed cooperative banks by ignoring the smaller ones. We found that the Sargan test just validates the instruments when the subsample is limited to the largest 551 cooperative banks. Because the results of this subsample are very similar to those obtained from the sample of moderately capitalized cooperative banks, we interpret them in favour of the total sample of cooperative banks. 20. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable proved to be significantly different from one except from the estimations of GMM-SYS for the group of savings banks. 
RESULTS
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CAP1
Notes:
The dependent variable CAP1 is defined as the book value of equity capital over total assets. DRISK measures the change in risk-weighted assets over total assets.
REG is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank's regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets is less than one standard deviation above a certain threshold and thus indicates regulatory pressure. ROA is measured by earnings over total assets. BDR measures the deposits to non-bank customers over total assets. PROV measures the loan-loss provisions over total assets. SIZE equals the natural logarithm of total assets and MERG is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank has taken over another bank in the relevant year. Time dummies are included in each regression but are not reported. GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS refer to GMM difference estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , respectively. Accordingly, all variables are first-differenced. As recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991) , one-step results are presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first-and second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. We report p-values on the basis of robust standard errors in parentheses.
* , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Notes:
The dependent variable CAP2 is a proxy variable for total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) over total assets. DRISK measures the change in risk-weighted assets over total assets. REG is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank's regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets is less than one standard deviation above a certain threshold and thus indicates regulatory pressure. ROA is measured by earnings over total assets. BDR measures the deposits to non-bank customers over total assets. PROV measures the loan-loss provisions over total assets. SIZE equals the natural logarithm of total assets and MERG is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank has taken over another bank in relevant year. Time dummies are included in each regression but are not reported. GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS refer to the GMM difference estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , respectively. Accordingly, all variables are first-differenced. As recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991) , one-step results are presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR (2) companies, by absorbing capital from the financial market or by realizing capital gains or losses on security transactions. In general, the coefficients tend to be lower in the GMM-DIF regression than in the GMM-SYS regression because of the special characteristics of the estimators. Contrary to previous US empirical literature, we do not find a significant relationship between the capital ratio and changes in portfolio risk (DRISK ) for all German banking groups, but for savings banks only. The coefficient of 0.0231 in Table 2a indicates that a one-percentage-point increase in RISK results in an increase of capital by 0.0231 percentage points. As other banks have much more excess capital on average than savings banks (see Table 1 ), they are less likely to be subject to regulatory constraints and may coordinate portfolio risk and capital unsystematically. Corresponding to H1C, we do not find a significant relationship for both all cooperative banks and other banks. The finding is in line with the buffer theory claiming a positive relationship only for banks with a moderate capital buffer as banks having a capital ratio far away from the regulatory minimum need not care about regulatory costs. In fact, when examining moderately capitalized banks only, we find a positive and significant relationship between changes in portfolio risk (DRISK ) and the capital ratio even for the cooperative and other banks. This result remains robust to variations in the 20% threshold. Accordingly, these moderately capitalized cooperative and other banks try to maintain their capital buffer by increasing both capital and portfolio risk, giving evidence in favour of H1A.
Coefficients for REG j,t Â DRISK j,t indicate whether the relationship between capital and risk for less capitalized banks under regulatory pressure is different from the relationship of well-capitalized banks under no regulatory pressure. In line with H1B, the negative coefficients of the interacted term REG j,t Â DRISK j,t indicate that the relationship between capital and risk is less pronounced for less capitalized banks. Supplementary tests confirm in nearly all cases that the relationship between capital and risk is insignificant for the banks under regulatory pressure. The fact that we do not obtain a negative relationship in case of less capitalized banks, as expected by H1B, might indicate that these banks have difficulties both in decreasing portfolio risk and increasing capital.
Further differentiating the results for both dependent variables CAP1 and CAP2, respectively, provides more insights. We find evidence for deviant behaviour of less capitalized savings banks depending on the definition of the capital ratio. While REG j,t Â DRISK j,t is insignificant for savings banks and additional tests indicate that even weakly capitalized savings banks positively coordinate changes in CAP1 and portfolio risk, we observe an insignificant relationship for these banks if CAP2 is considered. Furthermore, while the regulatory dummy variable (REG) is insignificant for the CAP1 capital equation of savings and cooperative banks in the GMM-SYS model, it turns significant and positive in the case of CAP2. The reasoning behind these findings could be the fact that savings banks can influence total capital (Tier 1 þ Tier 2 capital) easier than Tier 1 capital and that savings banks try to leave the zone of regulatory pressure by issuing subordinate debt or other hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital). In the case of moderately capitalized cooperative and other banks, however, we always find an insignificant coordination of capital and portfolio risk for banks under regulatory pressure irrespective of the definition of capital. Consequently, the results suggest that these banking groups can easily influence Tier 1 capital.
Profitability (ROA) is of great importance for both savings and cooperative banks, giving some evidence in favour of H2A. As expected, the relationship is weaker for the group of other banks (see H2B). We attribute this finding to the institutional characteristics of other banks. While savings banks and cooperative banks strongly rely on retained profits to increase capital, other banks may use alternative ways to increase capital.
The BDR is especially relevant for the group of all other banks. The lower the share of deposits to customers in relation to total assets, the higher is the increase in capital of these banks. However, we adhere this special effect to the heterogeneity of the group of other banks. In fact, specialized banks serving a certain niche in the banking industry without a noteworthy amount of deposits from customers often have very high capital ratios, while the competitive universal banks with a more pronounced deposit business usually have moderate capital ratios. Indeed, the strong negative relationship disappears if only moderately capitalized banks with a ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets less than 20% are considered and indicates little importance in regard to BDR for moderately capitalized other banks. However, we find a significant and positive relationship between BDR and the capital ratio for cooperative banks, which strongly fund themselves by accepting deposits from customers (see Table 1 ). The results indicate that cooperative banks with a higher BDR are more likely to gain new members and to increase capital.
Loan loss provisions ( PROV ) have a significant and positive effect on the capital ratio. The worse the financial health of the bank, the higher is the bank's increase in the capital ratio. Especially savings banks and cooperative banks seem to realize the necessity to increase capital as a buffer against unexpected losses along with their raise of loan loss provisions. In that regard, savings and cooperative banks voluntarily increase capital in the face of financial distress, although they are not forced to do so by regulatory pressure.
We find remarkable differences between the banking groups regarding the effect of size on the capital ratio. In the case of savings banks the effect is positive, which means that larger savings increase their capital ratio more strongly. However, the size effect is negative for other banks. Insofar, we obtain evidence in favour of H3A and H3B. The negative relationship between size and the change in the capital ratio holds even for moderately capitalized other banks. Otherwise it could be argued that the size effect is just a consequence of the heterogeneity of this banking group: large universal banks may aim at lower capital ratios than smaller highly specialized banks operating in niches.
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r 2008 The Authors Journal compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 Mergers (MERG) among banks seem to have a small impact on changes in the capital ratio. Only in the case of cooperative banks and other banks we find some evidence that mergers positively influence the capital ratio. We find no evidence, however, that banks preferably merge with weakly capitalized banks.
CONCLUSIONS
We find evidence in favour of the capital buffer theory, which claims that moderately capitalized banks try to maintain their regulatory buffer capital because of potential regulatory costs. Therefore, we gain evidence that banking regulation is effective in Germany as well. Indeed, changes in portfolio risk have a positive and significant effect on changes in the capital ratio for savings banks as regulation is likely to be binding for these moderately capitalized banks. If only moderately capitalized cooperative banks and other banks with a ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets of less than 20% are regarded, we obtain a positive and significant relationship between changes in the capital ratio and portfolio risk for these banking groups as well. However, we find no significant relationship for weakly capitalized banks under regulatory pressure. According to the buffer theory these banks increase capital and decrease portfolio risk to rebuild their capital buffer. By differentiating between diverse capital definitions, we find some evidence that savings banks can manage total capital more easily than Tier 1 capital. It coincides with our result that particularly savings banks use subordinated debt as an instrument to increase low capital ratios. Insofar, this result suggests that some savings banks have difficulties in funding themselves via retained earnings. Because the regulator has restricted the acknowledgement of subordinated debt up to 50% of Tier 1 capital and many savings banks already have nearly exploited this limit, cautiously opening the savings banks for alternative sources of private external Tier 1 capital thus might be an option to consider.
As expected, banks' profitability has a positive and significant impact on the capital ratio for savings banks and cooperative banks. These banks particularly depend on retained earnings, because they have fewer alternatives to increase their capital ratios than other banks. Furthermore, we find evidence that cooperative banks with a higher BDR can absorb capital from external sources more easily than other banks. Loan loss provisions as a signal of banks' bad financial health positively influence the capital ratio of savings and cooperative banks. Insofar, these banks seem to increase their capital ratio voluntarily in the case of poor financial health, independent of regulatory pressure. Finally, size has a negative impact on the capital ratio for other banks. The absence of the size effect for savings banks suggests that large savings banks cannot exploit scale effects in diversification due to investment restrictions and their business being restricted to the local area in
